CHAPTER V

THE GUILDS

A guild was a corporation, a sworn association consciously created and invested with privileges by a public authority. It was both a political body with civic duties and an economic corporation designed to regulate some craft or crafts. This definition of a guild was presented in Chapter One. Stated another way, a guild was the body of regulations, the authorized officals, and the process of enforcing and revising the regulations. We shall have occasion in a subsequent chapter to focus on the process involved, but here our attention will be directed to the regulations and the officials.

The regulations of a guild took the form of a list of rules, called on Ordnung. The Ordnung set out the basic rules of membership and promotion, defined the practices of the craft concerning what was made and how it was sold, and dealt with special topics peculiar to a craft, such as professional ethics or civic obligations. The Ordnungen have traditionally been the principal sources used in most guild histories, for the good reason that no other single source is so comprehensive. Most Ordnungen have articles on membership requirements, production and quality control, labor and hiring practices, marketing, administration and management; they provide a table of organization for each guild and what constraints were placed on the guildsmen. The regulations for each guild conformed very closely to the economic realities of the craft it governed. Changes in the craft or deficiencies in the Ordnung led to the creation of new articles, or the modification of existing ones, as needed. The guild regulations, in other words, were neither arbitrary nor static, but were the product of an on-going dialogue between city and guild.

The Barbers and Bathers Guild has exceptionally complete documentation, in part because the regulations are exceptionally complete in that they include definitions of the duties of guild officials and oaths taken by the guildsmen, and in part because there are actually two sets of Ordnungen. In 1638, what had been one guild became two, with a guild for the barbers and a guild for the bathers, each with its own Ordnung. The existence of two Ordnungen for two very similar crafts provides a rare opportunity to examine what purposes a guild was expected to fulfill.

The Handwerker-Akten give a partial record of the reasons for the split and how it was accomplished. In April 1638 the City Council granted permission to the barbers and bathers to write to Nuremberg and Regensburg, asking those cities how they administered their surgeons and bathers.<s1>s The replies were probably received sometime in May. In both it was stated that the two were considered to be separate crafts and both cities included extracts from their Ordnungen, and some of their articles were incorporated in the new regulations.<s2>s This inquiry was surely pro forma, as most guilds were aware of the practices and policies of other cities. On 8 June, the City Council empowered the Ordnungsherren, in conjunction with the Baumeister, to investigate the division of the guild into two separate entities and to report on their findings to the Rat. The reason for this investigation was given tersely: ''to put an end to the continuing disputes (Irrungen) between the Barbers and the Bathers''.<s3>s The separation came on 18 September 1638. Again, the reason given was concise and a bit vague: ''there has been much strife between the Barbers and Bathers, resulting in great confusion''.<s4>s Although the two had been one guild for at least a century, and probably for much longer, the whole process of division had taken less than five months. The rapidity and smoothness with which the split was accomplished should help dispel the notion than guilds were by nature too conservative to respond to be adaptable.

The city had moved quickly, but not incautiously. From beginning to end the City Council was firmly in control, and while the guildsmen themselves were the primary participants, there was no hint of autonomy in their actions. The initial impetus came from the guildsmen themselves. They wrote to Regensburg and Nuremberg, but with official permission. The committee that actually effected the separation was composed of guildsmen plus a city official; and the final documents, though drawn up by and for guildsmen, were sanctioned and formally issued by the City Council. This procedure typified relations between Rat and Handwerk, in which guildsmen worked in their own interest under the supervision of the city, thus ensuring that the needs of both parties were met.

The two Ordnungen issued in September of 1638 were very similar. The first five articles, concerning apprentices, were identical in both documents. An apprentice had to be at least twelve years old and of legitimate birth. He was presented to the guild by his sponsor, whereupon his name was recorded in the Book of Apprentices.<s5>s He served as an apprentice for three years, after which time he received a Lehrbrief -- a letter attesting to the fact that he had successfully completed his training and was of good moral character. As the youth journeyed, he would present his Lehrbrief as evidence of his learning and respectability.<s6>s He also paid a fee to the guild and city.<s7>s No master was allowed to have more than one apprentice, though he was allowed to employ his own sons in addition to an apprentice.<s8>s Widows were not allowed to have an apprentice at all.<s9>s Women were allowed to succeed to their husband's business and to run the shop, but were not entrusted with the training of new masters.

Only three articles were devoted to journeymen, an indication of the relative unimportance of Gesellen in this craft.<s10>s Here arises the first deviation between the two sets of regulations, discernible even in the sub-heading: the one concerns Barbiergesellen, the other concerns Badknechten.<s11>s The details of the articles differ in content as well as titles. For the barbers, the regulations were very limited in scope. No journeyman was allowed to work for two masters, none could be promoted until he had learned his craft, and each had to work up to six months for a master to whom he was in debt.<s12>s

The articles for the Badknechten are much more detailed and cover a wider range of topics. Article 6 of the Badordnung prohibited any Badknecht''who had not learned his craft according to the guild rules'' from practicing bleeding, bandaging, or anything pertaining to surgery. Fines were stiff: two florins for the first offense, four for the second, and eight for the third plus being thrown in irons (mit der Eysen zue samt der doppelten gelt Poen gestrafft werden). The untrained Knecht could cut hair, give massages, and do menial tasks around the Bad, but could not do surgical procedures; the guild and the city evidently recognized the dangers of a lack of competence

in this area. Article 7 of the Badordnung parallels Article 7 of the Barbierordnung, but stipulated additionally that an independent worker, living on his own (haush$bige Knecht), was allowed to work at a bath even though he did not work for the master, but he could cut hair (das trockene Schern). That Knechten could and did treat wounds and injuries is attested to by Article 8, which required a Knecht to report to the City Council any treatment administered by him in his masters's absence.

These articles on journeymen show a clear divergence in the function of hired workers within the two guilds. A Barbiergesell had limited duties that were not much more than an extension of his apprenticeship. Conditions in a bathhouse were quite different, and the regulations reflected this. A number of tasks, from maintenance of the baths to massages to bleeding, could be delegated to workers, freeing the master to concentrate on the surgical and business aspects of the Bad.

The prerequisites for acquiring the guild privilege were the same in both guilds: honorable birth, freedom from Leibeigenschaft, ten years' training and experience, of which three had to be spent in Wanderschaft and three in apprenticeship.<s13>s Sons of citizen-masters needed only eight years. Foreign journeymen (those who were not citizens of Augsburg) had to spend three of their ten years working for Augsburg masters, and were urged to marry the widow or daughter of a citizen-master.<s14>s The prospective master was not required to produce a masterpiece (Meisterst^ck), but he did have to take a test (Examen), which included the preparation of plasters and unguents. He was also required to explain the guild regulations.

All masters were urged to marry, preferably within the guild, but surprisingly none were required to do so. This laxness was unique among the four guilds; the others required foreign Gesellen to marry within the guild and required all masters to be married. The unmarried state (das ledigen Stand) was generally regarded with suspicion, an unz^nftig marriage scarcely less

so. Yet, Article 15 in both Ordnungen specifically says,''Still, no one in the guild is required to marry, but all are free and unbidden, and may also marry outside the guild.'' The estate of barber (or bather) was unehrlich, or at least was tainted with past association with such dishonorable status, and one would assume that the guild would be anxious to have its masters respectably married and safely married within the guild. Since this was not the case, other factors must have been at work here. Perhaps the article reflected the extraordinary conditions within the population resulting from the calamities of the Swedish Occupation. The documents provide no clue, but the puzzle remains intriguing.

No master in either guiid was allowed to have two shops, which had the effect of placing a virtual limit on an individual master's earnings.<s16>s master could increase his earnings only by increasing either volume or prices, neither of which was practical. Journeymen were restricted in what they couid do, and once fully-qualified they were not many years away from mastership themselves; the master would gain only a few years profit for his investment of years of training. Thus, an increase in a master's work force would have brought higher costs without a corresponding increase in income. Moreover, unlike a shoemaker's shop where a new journeyman could increase production right away and thus begin generating income, a barber would have had to attract new clients before his journeyman could even begin to be productive. Raising prices was also futile, for such a course would tend to make the master less competitive. The only possibility was to acquire wealthier clients, for these would be willing to pay higher fees. Some succeeded in this, but they were not many. With multiple shops, a master could exploit master/employees in a relationship similar to the putting-out system. Evidently some expansion along these lines had been attempted, or this Article 17 forbidding such practices would not have been written. Limited to a single shop, constrained by the nature of his market, a master barber could work the full length of a working day but could not expand his activities.

Both the barbers and the bathers were allowed to administer first aid, called erste band in the documents. The master was required to give erste band to all who sought it and no one was allowed to object, meaning that other medicai people could not accuse the master of stealing clients. This regulation had the effect of making any bathhouse or barber's shop available to serve as an emergency room for the inhabitants of the city. As with modern emergency rooms, payment for treatment was a problem. In cases where the erste band was sufficient, the patient was to make ''appropriate'' (ziemblich) payment,''which shall be approximately the cost of the cloth, or according to the terms of an agreement (nach erkanntnus der geschwornen Abkommen)''.<s17>s

The final few articles concerning masters covered a variety of points. Masters were forbidden to administer purgatives (innerlichen Purgirenden).<s18>s They were forbidden to reveal the secrets of their arts (Kundten).<s19>s They were allowed to work for institutions, such as monasteries.<s20>s Barbers were allowed to hang out as many signs as they wished, provided they did not open for business too early. Bathhouse keepers, on the other hand, were permitted no more than two signs on their doors.<s21>s I can discover no reason for this limitation.

Article 27 is an oath, taken annually by the masters. It reads the same for both guilds, and is reproduced here in full:

The sense of this Article is that barbers and bathers were intended to administer only erste band and similar types of elementary medical care, in addition to bleeding which was their stock-in-trade. The emphasis laid on treating those in need regardless of their wealth or social standing is repeated in other sources as well. It is understandable that a master would be reluctant to treat someone who could not pay the fee, but the city obviously regarded this service as something akin to a right that all possessed. The final portion of the oath is the most interesting. It had the effect of turning barbers and bathers into coroners, investigating the cause of injuries. We know from other sources that the barbers and bathers were charged with the responsibility of determining the cause of death in cases where the cause was in question. This occurred most frequently in cases where people died on the streets, these often being the homeless poor or strangers.<s22>s

The two guilds also had their geschwornen Maistern, the Sworn Masters who were the officials closest to the guildsmen themselves. They were charged with examining a patient, diagnosing him, and setting the fee.<s23>s They also were responsible for ensuring that only competent (best$ndig und taugenlich) masters could hang out their signs. This they did by inspecting each master's shop with regard to''only the common good of rich and poor alike and nothing else, by their oath''.<s24>s

The Ordnung also set out the duties and power of the Overseer (Vorgeer). Each served only four years, with a new one appointed every two years, so that one of the officials was always senior and the other was junior.<s25>s The Overseer could summon anyone within the guild and judge him. No one was allowed to speak disrespectfully to the Overseer or the offender would find himself in die Eisen gelegt. Although some of these Overseers were guildsmen, guild membership was not a requirement; the City Council could appoint whomever it saw fit.<s26>s

Articles 31 - 37 repeat earlier admonitions regarding masters working outside their own shops and unqualified journeymen practicing medicine. Article 38 of the Barbierordnung and Article 39 of the Baderordnur stated specifically that whoever was not a master was allowed to perform only the Na] schern (shave and a bath) and Schr[pfen (a mild form of bleeding). Article 39 of the Barbierordnung prohibited any executioner (Z^chtigr or Frauenbilder) from doing work reserved to the barbers and bathers.

Articles 40 - 43 of the Barbierordnung parallel Articles 51 - 54 of the Baderordnung, and deal with administrative matters. Article 40 (51) is interesting in the light it sheds on the mechanics of how guild rules were communicated to the membership. Although many, perhaps most, could read, printing personal copies for everyone was out of the question, so other methods were used. The article required the Overseer to read the regulations to the entire guild once a year. Anyone who became master during the year was to go to the Overseer and have the regulations read without delay. No one could claim ignorance of the rules.

Article 41 (52) prohibited the masters from forming secret societies:

Articles 40 - 50 of the Baderordnung are the other place where the two sets of regulations deviated significantly, for there is no analog of them in the regulations of the Barbers Guild. They provide insight into how the public baths operated and deal mostly with the various types of work and workers in the bath. For example, those who administered massages at the baths were not the Knechten of the master, but neither were they allowed to work at the bath without his permission. With his permission, they were to give one half of their income to the master.<s27>s Another example: the health dangers of public baths were fully recognized, and masters were not to allow into their baths any person who had sickness or disease.<s28>s

The articles of these two Ordnungen reflect the fact that these were crafts whose prime function was to provide a personal service. There were two areas of focus in the regulations of both guilds: the treatment of patients, and the definition of jobs and areas of competence, with the former applying more to masters and the latter applying more to journeymen and employees. In other words, the principal function of these guilds was to define and supervise what services were rendered, by whom, to whom, and under what circumstances. We have already seen that it was the service orientation of barbering that gave the craft its distinctive character, and accounted for the type of membership in the guild. This service orientation was also the source for many of the guild's regulations.

The regulations provide some clues to the reasons why barbers and bathers divided into two separate corporations. The two points at which the Ordnungn diverged were the Knechten and the baths. In both cases, the Bader of Augsburg required more detailed legislation than did the Barbierer. From other sources we know that bathhouses were declining in numbers, while the number of barbers was on the rise.<s29>s It is therefore probable that when the previous set of regulations were written, no earlier than 1549, the barbers had been a subordinate group in a craft dominated by the bathers. By the 1630's, however, the barbers were by far the most numerous group. The bathers being still numerous enough and influential enough to demand their own privilege (Gerechtigkeit), the only solution was to incorporate each craft in independent guilds. The specific timing of the split can be laid to a sharp rise in disputes between the two groups, referred to in the preliminary documents discussed earlier, which in turn may well have been caused by the demographic crisis of the years 1624 - 1635.

A complete set of regulations for the Millers Guild is also preserved in the city archive. The M^llerordnung of 1549 was re-issued several times during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, with no substantive changes in the articles. We have already seen that there was little change in the technical and economic aspects of the craft, and this was surely the reason for the stability in its administration. Here, as in the case of the Barbers and Bathers Guild, the guild conformed closely to the craft.

Four basic areas were addressed in the M^llerordnung: admission to mastership, labor relations, prices, and relations with other guilds. There were forty-one articles for the millers, comparable to the forty-three articles of the Barbierordnung and the fifty-four articles of the Baderordnung.

Articles 1 - 8 cover relations with outsiders, 9 - 27 and 41 set milling prices, Articles 28 - 31 concern masters, and 32 - 40 cover hiring practices and other matters relating to Knechten.<s30>s

One of the concerns of the first eight articles was the prevention of bribery. Article 1 says, in part:

Analogous rules obtained in other guilds as well, aimed at preventing a master from enticing customers away from other masters by underhanded means. The fact that concern over bribery appears in the very first article of the M^llerordnung is perhaps a reflection of the widespread belief that all millers were basically dishonest.

Article 5 forbids bakers from offering gifts of food or drink to a miller. Article 6 forbids millers from making similar bribes to bakers. The prohibitions against favors and other forms of bribery were aimed at preventing the miller from stealing customers from his fellow guildsmen and at preventing the baker from obtaining special treatment from the miller. As one of the few places where a miller could gain a competetive edge over other millers, bribery was a recurring problem. Other regulations dealt with the buying and selling of grain (Article 1), business with the carters called ''sack carriers'' (Article 7), and doing business in the marketplace (Article 2).

Regulations concerning admission to the guild were remarkably few and brief. There was no word at all about apprenticeship or journeymanship. No masterpiece was required in this guild, which is not surprising sine a miller did not actually make anything. Admission to the guild cost 22 florins for a foreigner, one florin only for the son or daughter of a master.<s31>s Generally speaking, anyone not the son of a master could not expect themselves to become a master. With so few positions open in the city, each mastership would normally have been filled by sons or other relatives. The abnormally high fees set for foreigners, and the low fee for sons and daughters (the latter allowing a daughter to transfer the guild privilege to her husband), indicates that the guild had little desire to admit outsiders into its midst.

The only other relevant article provided that no master who owned his- own home (hau]h$big) was allowed to leave the city without the permission of the City Council.<s32>s This rule is an indication of how important milling was to the city; I can see no reason why the masters themselves would desire such a provision. It might also have been aimed at preventing the miller from buying grain directly from the farmers.

There were a number of articles regarding laborers -- the M^hlknechten. A Knecht served his master for a full year. Every St. George's Day, the Knecht was free to seek other employment, and the master was free to hire a different Knecht.<s33>s The Knecht was to be paid at least every two weeks, and was normally paid weekly.<s34>s Since a Knecht was likely to be a hired hand, rather than a master-in-training, he might not know the guild rules, and such ignorance was not allowed. If a miller hired a man who had not taken the Miller's Oath, he had to bring the man before the Mayor within eight days and have him take the oath (in angeloben lassen umb die Zaichen).<s35>s No master was allowed to fire his Knecht without just cause, nor hire one away from another master.<s36>s Neither could the Knecht quit without reason.<s37>s These articles all point to a desire for a very stable and secured labor pool, one in which there was little freedom of movement for either party. This probably was the mutual desire of everyone involved. The city would have wanted the business of milling free from dislocations caused by labor problems. The masters depended upon the Knechten to transact their daily business; without the workers, the mills would shut down. The Knechten were unskilled and of low social status, so were probably desirous of long-term employment.

Setting of prices received the greatest amount of attention in the M^llerordnung. The articles were quite specific, but were not consistent in the units of measurement used nor were they always clear as to how fees were to be collected. The only charges involved in milling were fees -- a payment for services rendered. No one actually bought anything, as direct sale of grain was strictly prohibited.<s38>s The customer brought his grain to the mill, it was milled, he paid the miller, then carried away his flour or meal or malt. Fees varied not only according to the type of grain milled, but also according to the type of customer: baker, brewer, merchant (Hucker) or private citizen (Hau]leuth). The articles setting prices are summarized by the following table and are drawn from Articles 9 - 25:

The unit of measurement used was the Schaff, or sheaf. The monetary unit was the Pfennig. The brewers paid four Pfennige per Schaff for malt.<s39>s The fine for charging over these rates was set at one florin for each violation<s40>s Since there were about 240 Pfennig in a florin, the fines were considerable.<s41>s

The regulations for the guild itself were very few; when one takes away the twenty articles devoted to setting milling fees, there were only twenty-one articles that concerned guild activities. This Ordnung, in fact, does not look anything like what one might have expected -- no journeymen or apprentices, no regulation of production or quality, no masterpiece. The usual trappings are absent. Compare this Ordnung with one from the Weavers Guild, with its many articles on the subjects just mentioned, and one can begin to appreciate that guilds could take on a wide variety of forms.<s42>s

There exists another document that, while not an Ordnung, yields useful information regarding the Millers Guild. This document is the Instruction zur die M^hl-Visitatores, or Instruction to the Mill Inspectors, issued in 1722. The Instruction is especially helpful in revealing the types of fraud perpetrated by millers, and the principal areas of concern to the city itself. The city was determined to keep a firm hand on the supply of grain and bread. It will be shown presently that the city was no less determined to collect every penny of taxes that could be levied on the grain trade. The full title of this document, dated 1722 but pertaining to offices and policies in effect well before that date, is Instruction zur die M^hl-Visitatores, welche sie jahrlich, auch ein jeder Neu-Antrettender bey dessen Aufnahm, vor dem Ungeld- und Getreyd-Aufschlagsamt zu beschowren haben. In other words, these were sworn officials reporting to the Tax Commission and to the Grain Office. They were charged with keeping watch''over all mills in the Schrand and outside of it, by day and night''. They were further charged with overseeing all grain transactions by bakers, brewers, distillers, confectioners and Melbern.<s43>s

The foundation for all inspections of the mills was laid by Article 2, quoted here in full:

The Zettel was the key to the system. It provided the basis for all inspections and fines, and was the document used for calculating the Ungeld, a sales tax levied on basic food items.<s44>s It is evident that the problem of fraudulence persisted at least into the eighteenth century.

Millers and their customers were required to show their grain sacks on the Inspector's demand. If the contents were different or more than what was specified on the ticket, the Inspector took immediate action: ''soll der Visitator solches Getreyd alsobald mit Arrest belegen''.<s45>s He could remove excess grain and confiscate it.<s46>s There was obviously room here for abuse of authority, and the Inspectors were instructed to be impartial. To help ensure this, all measuring of grain by an Inspector was to be done in the presence of both the miller and the customer.<s47>s Should the Inspector measure anyone's grain fraudulently, he was fined 30 kreuzer, a rather paltry sum.<s48>s

The Grain Office received a weekly list of milling done, based on the Grain Office tickets.<s49>s The bakers, likewise, provided to the Grain Office a summary statement of Ungeld paid, while the Inspectors compiled a statement of Ungeld paid by any others who came to the mills.<s50>s

In the Millers Guild, as in the others, foreigners were of special concern. The article relating to them also reveals that the city's main objective was still the collection of revenue: "The Inspectors shall pay special attention to foreigners who do business at any mill, inside or outsi$ the city, that the ungeld may be levied."<s51>s The same article forbids millers from milling grain claimed to be tax-exempt, unless they first obtained special permission to do so.

A number of dodges were employed to avoid paying the tax. Sometimes, inferior grades of grain were used.<s52>s A more subtle ruse was to cover a sack of white flour malt with a layer of barley malt, which was lower quality and was subject to a lower tax.<s53>s Another trick was to bring a quantity of grain to the mill, then leave, with the customer claiming that he would pick up his flour later. His true intent, however, was to stay away until the Inspector had left, then return with more grain, to be milled tax-free.<s54>s A variation of this was to have the milling done at a different mill from the one on the ticket, thus avoiding the officials. ''The Inspectors must watch for this'', admonishes Article 16. Finally, milling might be done secretly at night. This was forbidden, even down to the picking up or dropping of grain after hours, for the obvious reason that this could easily be un-ticketed grain.<s55>s The Inspectors could not be on duty twenty-four hours a day.

The grain market was held on Thursdays and Fridays. Two Inspectors were detailed to oversee all buying and selling,''to ensure that all is done fairly and truly''.<s56>s They were to take''particular care that all pay the Ungeld'', and no one was allowed out of the marketplace without their grain sacks having been ticketed.<s57>s The city even anticipated disasters, in its quest to collect all the tax: when a ''water-related calamity'' (Wasser-Mangels-Zeit) struck (i.e., flood, drought, ice jams and the like), and grain had to be taken outside the city to be milled, the Inspectors were to be stationed at the city gates. There the Grain Office tickets had to be presented, and the sacks inspected, or the grain could not enter or leave.<s58>s

The final article set the standard of conduct for the Mill Inspectors. It is an interesting statement of moral standards for public officials and of the difficulties they faced:

The comment about "respect or friendship" and about the station of those the Inspectors supervised indicates the power that such factors had in early modern society -- they were at least as influential as bribes!

The picture that emerges from the Ordnung and the Instruction is one of a guild firmly and closely controlled by the city. This was a very small industry, but it was a key industry, and the mills were convenient points of control. In the Ordnung itself there is not a word about guild officers, regulation of production, and very little about admission to the guild. Instead, the articles concentrated on such matters as prices, customer relations and, in the Instruction, tax collection. These were all matters of more concern to the city than to the masters, and the provisions of the articles redounded more to the benefit of the government than the guild. This probably was the result of the past circumstances of this craft. The mills were at one time entirely under the control of public agencies, and the master millers were little more than servants. The guild never had the chance afforded most others -- the opportunity of being ignored by the government. As a trade of vital importance to the entire city, the guild was created and operated less for private gain than for the public good.

No Ordnung for the Joiners Guild has survived. Many of the individual articles have survived, however, appearing as supporting documents to petitions. Of one hundred articles in the Kistlerordnung, at least 70 have survived, so it is still possible to get a close look at this guild. The most serious effect of not having a complete Ordnung is that no conclusions can be drawn about what was not covered by the regulations. It is also impossible to determine which areas were of the greatest concern to the guild. Nevertheless, certain aspects of the guild can be examined.

Quality control played a small role in the Barbers Guild and the Millers Guild. In the Joiners Guild, on the other hand, considerable attention was paid to it. The use of inferior or altered wood was the primary concern. Joiners would paint over inferior woods, then claim that they were high quality and sell them as such. This practice was expressly forbidden.<s60>s Other articles prohibited the use of soft woods in place of hard woods, the failure to use the quality of wood that was customarily used in certain types of furniture, and the disguising of inferior woods by gluing a panel of good wood over the surface.<s61>s Probably other methods were used in manufacturing inferior products, but only these prohibitions have survived.

Quality control was not exercised at the shop, as it was in the case of milling, but in the marketplace. The only extant articles deal with the three annual''open'' markets, which were the only markets at which foreign joiners could offer their wares to the citizens of Augsburg. The guild inspectors, called Geschaumeistern, were enjoined to inspect the goods offered by foreigners, which included ''work that is forbidden to our own masters'', and to mark inferior pieces with a''B'', for''B[]'' (b[se).<s62>s Each item so marked was fined at the rate of 15 kreuzer per florin of value, or 25 percent of the selling price (60 kr. = 1 fl.). It is possible that among the missing articles were ones that set forth guidelines by which the Geschaumeister could judge works, but it is also possible that he simply used his own judgment in the matter. There were four Geschaumeistern, all appointed by the City Council. They were sworn officials, bound to ''mark products to their best understanding, good for good and bad for bad''.<s63>s Inspections of the shops were carried out four times a year: at each of the three annual markets, and at Christmas, plus any time the Geschaumeister felt it was necessary.<s64>s

Labor was an important concern in this guild. As I have shown already in Chapter V, a fluctuating demand for labor led to the creation of a central agency whose sole function was to manage the assignment of journeymen to masters. This was the Herberg, a kind of inn where journeymen lived while not working, run by a master who was called Vatter by the journeymen themselves but whose official title was Zuschickmeister, or Jobmaster.

Two provisions were the key to making the system of Zuschick work. The first required every master in the guild who wanted a journeyman to write his request on a note, a Zuschickmeister Zettel. Without this written request, he could receive no journeymen. The fine for hiring a journeyman without the Jobmaster's knowledge was one florin, a substantial amount.<s65>s The same article provided that the journeyman was not allowed to ''hire on of his own free will to this or that master, as was done before''.<s66>s The second article established that requests for labor would be met in sequence:

Both master and journeyman, however, had a right to reject each other. The master came in person to the Herberg to interview his prospective employee at a table. If they got up from the table together, the agreement was sealed; otherwise, there was no deal. If the journeyman refused work, he had to wait a week to be reassigned.<s68>s If the journeyman refused work three times, he lost his right to choose and was assigned anyway.<s69>s Hiring was done Sunday and Monday morning. If a journeyman had not been placed by Monday afternoon, he had to wait until the following Sunday to seek work again.<s70>s

Retailing of finished works by joiners was also closely watched. The actual process of manufacture received only slight attention, but the activity in the three annual markets was carefully regulated. As mentioned above, the Geschaumeistern were active during these markets, which were held on the day celebrating the consecration of St. Ulrich's Church (the Kirchweyhen), St. Ulrich's Day, and St. Michael's Day.<s71>s Only one large item (usually one of the large armoires or similar cabinets) could be offered for sale at a time.<s72>s Smaller items, such as beds and desks could be offered in addition to the large Kasten.<s73>s The fact that a joiner could offer only three Kasten for sale in the public market annually did not preclude him from doing ''bespoken'' work for individual customers, who would simply come to the master in his shop and order a particular piece. The types of items that could be offered varied over time, but all came under the modern definition of furniture.<s74>s No citizen joiner was allowed to purchase the word of a foreign joiner. The only exception to this rule, which was essentially to prevent citizen joiners from going into the import business, was window frames (Fenster Rahmen).<s75>s No master could offer goods for sale in the Trendlmarkt, a city market at which only second-hand goods were sold.<s76>s I cannot discover who in the city had the right to sell used furniture, which was surely a viable market in itself. Joiners, in any case, were allowed to sell only new furniture that they themselves had made. Toward this end, no master was allowed to offer the work of another master for sale.<s77>s This was aimed at keeping one master from becoming the virtual employee of another. Another article, dating from the same period, reinforced this goal:

The penalty for violating this article was confiscation of the work plus five Pfennige for every florin of value on the item sold or purchased.<s78>s

The similarities between carpentry and joinery gave rise to a number of difficulties, some of which were addressed in the guild regulations. Carpenters were allowed to do joinery (die Kistler arbait), but only after they had successfully produced a joiner's masterpiece.<s79>s Not only was the unqualified carpenter forbidden to do joinery, but a joiner could not hire a carpenter to do such work.<s80>s The only time a carpenter could engage in joinery was when making chests or beds for his own use, and these he was not even allowed to give away.<s81>s

Carpenters did not present the only problem of competition for the joiners. Chestmakers belonged to the Joiners Guild, but were strictly limited in what they were allowed to make. Articles 47 through 50, dating sometime before 1600, set forth in careful detail the requirements for a masterpiece for the B^chsenschiffter (Chestmakers), which included three different

chests.<s82>s The subordinate nature of the Chestmakers is revealed in the article that allowed a joiner to make chests (schifften), but forbade the Schiffter to do joinery. Unlike other guildsmen, the chestmakers were allowed to sell their wares outside the city as they pleased.<s83>s This freedom was unusual, and may well have tempted joiners into selling outside the city by way of the chestmakers.

Admission to the guild followed carefully prescribed rules that, in contrast to the admission procedures of the millers and barbers, conformed to the stereotypical image of guild rules. Training took ten years, including apprenticeship -- a typical period of time. During the period of journeying, the individual had to work a minimum of two years for one or two citizen masters, thus providing the necessary exposure to local custom and the necessary opportunity for the guild to scrutinize the character of the potential master.<s84>s The masterpiece was to be made at the master's home or, if the journeyman had no master, at the Herberg.<s85>s The Sworn Masters inspected the piece --''a Kasten of skillful work'' -- at least three times, and inspected it again upon completion.<s86>s The finished work was then presented to the Verordnete of the guild, who were paid one florin''for their trouble'' by the journeyman. It was they who finally approved both journeyman and masterpiece. If they judged the journeyman worthy (gnuegsam), he was thenceforward to be called''master'', ''and be held equal to all the other rightful masters, and be so recorded in the guild's Book of Masters''.<s87>s

No more than three journeymen each year were allowed to undertake a masterpiece, of whom no more than two could be foreigners.<s88>s In addition to these three, a journeyman who married the widow of a master could make a masterpiece, presumably to permit him to make a sufficient living as quickly as possible and have the legitimate right to operate the widow's shop.<s89>s If three new joiners were admitted every year, then there would be thirty new masters every decade. Since the guild had about 115 masters, this would imply a complete replacement of membership during the course of four decades. Furthermore, since the average age of a new master was somewhere in the neighborhood of thirty, the normal working life span of a master would be around forty years. That these figures are so close is coincidence, but they do bear out the basic conclusion that three masters was about the right number for this guild to admit a year. Here is still more evidence that the guilds in fact did know what they were doing and had a fairly good idea of how to manage their labor supply. Further evidence on this score is provided by a regulation promulgated sometime prior to 1664, at a time when the Joiners Guild was still very small compared to its pre-Thirty Years' War levels. The article stated: ''Henceforward, that the guild not be overwhelmed as it has in the past, only one shall be admitted to the mastership each year.''<s90>s A sharp reduction in the industry and in membership called forth a similar reduction in the number of masters that could be admitted each year.

Admission fees were twenty florins for those foreigners who married outside the guild.<s91>sIt should be noted that this is the same figure that applied to foreign millers. One purpose of the high fees was to ensure that any outsider admitted into the guild would be a successful businessman, for anyone who could afford to pay twenty florins was certainly well established. The fee structure (high for foreigners, low for sons of guildsmen) also reflects the endogamous nature of guilds, a trait consciously designed to produce stability in both guild and city.

It is difficult to draw conclusions from incomplete records. From what has survived, however, a few things can be asserted with confidence. The guild regulations confirm that retailing and labor were vitally important concerns to the joiners. For the first time, there is clear evidence of fear of foreign competition. Foreign was defined in the regulations as any product coming from further than two miles (Meile) from Augsburg, a highly restricted market region.<s92>s

The joiners were a corporation that conformed more closely to the stereotype of a guild. Labor and quality control were two areas of significant regulation. The purpose of the labor legislation has already been discussed. The articles on quality control were directed mostly at foreigners, to ensure that inferior products were not offered by them for sale in the open markets. Other articles were more general, directed at all masters. One cannot argue here that the concern of the guild to produce high quality goods was a matter of being competetive in foreign markets, for the joiners sold almost exclusively in the local market. Rather, these articles represent a genuine concern for craftsmanship. The guild wished to prevent selling a piece made from inferior woods. The aim was not to prevent a master from overcharging. The guild forbad him to make an inferior piece even if he sold it as such.

Two other areas were also the subject of legislation, and these perhaps one would be less likely to expect: retailing and the definition of markets. The latter was the marking off of boundaries between cognate guilds, a perennial problem. The former was the regulation of the marketplace. As pointed out in the chapter on the crafts, historians have concentrated so much attention on the master's shop that they have neglected his role as retailer. The guild regulations committed no such oversight. What a master could sell, when, where and to whom, were matters of great importance. Any guild whose artisans sold directly to the public would have such articles, the study of which could provide significant insights into the history of business.

There is no copy extant of an Ordnung for the Shoemakers Guild of Augsburg, and few of the individual articles have survived. Only twenty Articulen exist in all, scattered among two centuries' worth of documents, though there were at least seventy-three articles in the original Ordnung.<s93>s With less than thirty percent of the articles available, it is impossible to draw a full portrait of this guild, nor will one be attempted here. Although individual points will be examined for what they may reveal, the general outlines of the Shoemakers Guild must remain obscure.

Most of the surviving articles concern the buying and selling of leather. Skins and hides came from the butchers, a large and prosperous guild that brought a great deal of livestock into the city.<s94>sThere was a limit placed on how much leather a non-citizen could offer for sale in the leather market, called the Failenmarkt<s95>s

Concern existed not only that a foreigner might usurp the Failenmarkt, but also that a citizen might somehow dominate the leather trade. To prevent such a development, an article forbad any Augsburg master from writing a master in another city concerning leather, without the knowledge of the Overseer.<s96>s Only through correspondence could a shoemaker arrange a deal to undercut local suppliers, so the city needed to keep a close watch on it. A similar article prohibited a master from transacting bulk sales from his own shop, though he was allowed to do so in a shop specially designated for the purpose (Wirthaus). Masters were further forbidden to''deal with a citizen merchant for himself alone and outside the guild.<s97>s A master shoemaker could easily develop into a shoe or leather merchant in areas where the market for such items was sufficiently large, as long as the city erected no legal barriers.<s98>s The master-merchant could reduce other masters to dependency by choking off their supply of leather. This development was generally resisted by city governments, and these articles represent Augsburg's attempts along these lines.

The city also tried to control leather prices, though the attempt was rather lame. An article written sometime prior to 1670 ordered that ''each and every price shall be as of old, and no master shall be allowed to buy more than what the rest of the guild buys.''<s99>s The article goes on to exclude (ausgschlossen), or make liable to a fine, any master who refused to abide by''the old prices (die alte schuld unnd kauff)'' for hides and pelts, not shoes. No attempt was made to regulate prices at the point of sale. The vagueness of the wording in this article is in sharp contrast to the detall of the M^llerordnung, and would seem to make it all but unenforceable. Why would a city government make such precise stipulations for one guild and make little more than an empty gesture for another? Part of the reason is that specificity was vital in milling becuse grain was so vital. Barefoot people do not die; hungry people do. It is possible, too, that the articles were produced by the guildsmen themselves and not by the city. Since the city had no interest in controlling the price of leather, it approved without qualm an unenforceable regulation. This provides supporting evidence for the contention that the guildsmen themselves wrote their own Ordnungen, while the city merely reviewed and approved them.

Several articles provide insight into the progression from apprentice to journeyman to master. The placing of an apprentice with a master was accomplished through negotiations between the parents (or ''friends'' - ''befreundten'') and the prospective master. If the two parties arrived at a satisfactory agreement as to the type and amount of the apprenticeship fee to be paid to the master, then the boy was presented to the guild. Apprenticeship lasted five years, if a Lehrgeld was paid, or six years if none was paid. The son of a master, however, need serve an apprenticeship of only three years, without Lehrgeld.<s100>s No one could take on an apprentice without the consent of the Guild Overseer. If the apprentice were a foreigner, he was required to produce letters (briefliche Urkunden) attesting to his honorable birth. A native needed to produce two citizens (Mitb^rgern) who would attest to the respectability of his birth.<s101>s

Training as a journeyman varied considerably. A master's son was the most privileged, and needed only three years in addition to the three years apprenticeship, and these could be spent in Augsburg or elsewhere.<s102>s A foreigner had to serve ten years, of which three had to be for masters of Augsburg. They were also required to get married before they could become masters. As soon as the journeyman decided to become a master, his name was recorded. Only when all prerequisites were met was he allowed to attempt his masterpiece. Details on the next step, from journeyman to master, are unfortunately lacking. The favoring of the sons of masters seen in this guild was nearly universal among early modern guilds.

It is difficult to draw conclusions from so few articles, but certain limited observations can be made. The extant articles deal primarily with labor and with Lederkauf, the buying and selling of leather. The labor legislation is expected, for shoemakers employed many journeymen and relations between the two were anything but smooth. The emphasis on Lederkauf is likewise unsurprising, but it does seem strange that no articles appeared regarding the making and selling of shoes. If the leather received attention, why not the shoe? Whatever the reason, one would think that at least one or two articles along these lines would have appeared in the Handwerker-Akten.

The regulations of these four (actually five) guilds reveal a variety that is almost bewildering: the total number of articles of the five Ordnungen is well over three hundred. Yet there were common areas of concern addressed in each, allowing us to draw some general observations from the confusion. These areas included social and moral legislation, membership and admission, production, labor, retailing and administration. The variety resulted from the different approaches taken in each guild to these common concerns.

The particular approach taken was determined by the special conditions that existed in each craft. We should avoid the mistake of other guild historians of blaming the guild regulations for interfering with economic processes. The example of these guilds demonstrates that the reverse was actually the case: regulations were written in response to economic reality. Regulations were also written to accomodate the demand of the city for good order; this was most evident in the case of the grain market and the Millers Guild, but it was also manifest in the city's action in separating the barbers from the bathers.

If the differences were craft-specific, whence sprang the common concerns? These came from a system of values shared by guildsmen and city alike. Those who see in the guild regulations only the values of protectionism, conservatism and particularism gravely misinterpret the evidence. They also err in accusing only the guildsmen. Ricard T. Rapp has shown that the city officials of Venice were more guilty of these''sins'' than were the guildsmen themselves. It was the city that blocked innovations that would have increased production over the protests of the guildsmen.<s103>s It was the city that imposed controls on production that hurt Venetian competetiveness in international markets.<s104>s The source of this attitude was a deeply-held belief on the part of the government that superior quality would eventually win out, as well as a desire to protect the reputation of the city for turning out high-quality wares. Rapp shows that the guildsmen saw the economic reality more clearly than did their government, and were more flexible in meeting the challenges of economic change.<s105>s The Augsburg documents suggest a similar conclusion. There is no sign of diverging opinions here, but rather a common faith that rules and regulations were the key to a well-ordered society. By examining the areas of common concern, it is possible to extract some of the tenets of that common faith.

Perhaps the most unexpected aspect of the Articulen was the lack of moral legislation. The guilds took no cognizance of religious festivals or patron saints; there was nothing said about parades or civic duties; there were no provisions for the welfare of the sick or indigent members. No regulation exhorted the master to see to his apprentice's moral and religious life, nor was any entertainment or vice forbidden. These subjects and more appeared in the regulations of numerous guilds in the Middle Ages, yet they appear not at all in the five Augsburg guilds examined in the present study.<s106>s There was, however, a body of articles that can be considered social legislation, having to do with the socially vital areas of birth and marriage.

A concern with the members' lineage has long been recognized as a characteristic feature of the guild system. The basic formula was that all prospective guildsmen must be of eheliche und ehrliche Geburt (legitimate and honorable birth), and free of Leibeigenschaft (personal servitude or serfdom). Birth out of wedlock had always been unacceptable in Christian society, and simple craftsmen lacked the resources to obtain papal dispensations. Honorable birth meant a birth untainted by low social status. There were a number of trades and stations that were unehrlich, but the exact composition of the list changed with time and place. Barbers and millers, for example, were unehrliche Leute in some places and times, but they were not considered such in seventeenth century Augsburg.<s107>s The dishonorable status often derived from the trade's current or past stain of Leibeigenschaft. Being the ''man of another man'' was unforgivable in the cities, which were by tradition havens of personal freedom. Any hint of serfdom or servitude was sufficient cause to exclude one from guild membership. This attitude was virtually universal throughout Germany.<s108>s

One of the few historians who have correctly understood the intent of this legislation is Mack Walker, whose book on German towns covers the period from the Thirty Years' War to German unification. He showed that these constituted social legislation, the aims of whi&h were subscribed to by city and guild alike. The rules with regard to the condition of birth and lineage were intended to help ensure social stability and maintain the honor of the guild and the city.<s109>s Illegitimate or dishonorable persons were viewed as social misfits, potentially too dangerous to allow into respectable society. The rules requiring masters to marry were likewise aimed at producing social stability, for a married person was generally regarded as reliable and respectable.

The same goal of a stable and respectable society informed the regulations pertaining to the standards for admission to the guilds. The favoritism shown to the sons of masters is the prime example of this. Often misinterpreted as economic protectionism, this favoring of one's own was actually a form of social protectionism, designed not so much to exclude economic competitors as to exclude the socially unacceptable.<s110>s The guilds and the city viewed the sons of citizen-masters as the best known and most reliable element, non-guild citizens as the next most acceptable, and foreigners as the most socially suspect of all groups. Foreigners were again divided into citizens of other towns and country folk, with the latter being the least acceptable of all. This was a social hierarchy, not an economic scheme, and it was adhered to almost everywhere.<s111>s

Despite the universal concern for maintaining a membership that was honorable and respectable, admission procedures were not universal but rather were adapted to the special needs and conditions of each craft. Even the masterpiece which, to judge from most guild histories, was virtually a trademark of the guild system, is found to have taken on three different forms among the four guilds studied here. The masterpiece existed in its stereotypical form in the Joiners Guild and in the Shoemakers Guild. The barbers and bathers, however, made no masterpiece but instead took an Examen, while the millers made no masterpiece and took no examinations. As far as can be inferred from the documents, a miller became master simply by being installed as one by the owner of the mill, and of course after paying the appropriate fees. This set the Millers Guild apart from other guilds, even as the peculiar conditions of the craft set milling apart from other crafts. The point here is that even something as seemingly elemental as the masterpiece upon closer examination turns out to have been as adaptable as any other practice in the guilds.

In terms of rules governing production, the principle focus was not on regulating quantity and quality, areas with which guilds would presumably be preoccupied. There was, in fact, no direct legislation regulating the quantity of goods that could be produced. Only by limiting labor were production levels affected. In general, guildsmen were free to produce as much as they wished. More surprising was the scarcity of articles on the quality of production. The guilds apparently relied more on the judgment of the Geschaumeister and other inspectors than on written guidelines. It appears from the articles studied here that craftsmen were more or less free to make what they pleased, and caveat emptor. The force of consumer tastes and one's competition were sufficient to keep most producers within certain bounds, but a change in shoe styles, for example, had to come from the hands of a shoemaker somewhere, and such changes were certainly frequent. It is difficult to see how regulations could have been written to assure quality in shoes that had not yet been invented.

The emphasis of articles relating to production was not on quality or quantity, but on defining who could make what. This was a difficult problem that afflicted all but the Millers Guild. In the other three guilds, the cost of starting up a business were so low that masters in related trades could easily expand their operations. This was strictly forbidden in every case. I do not think that the articles on this subject were designed to limit or eliminate competition, as one might suppose after a first reading. Rather, they were an expression of the conviction that each trade, each Beruf, had its own proper sphere of activity, and that it was contrary to right order that anyone should infringe on it.<s112>s This principle was easy to enunciate but difficult to apply in the world of the small artisan, for the lines that divided trades were by no means clear. The desire for clearly defined trades led to frequent conflicts between guilds in many industries and in many cities. A tanner and a shoemaker could be distinguished, as could a miller and a baker. The line between carpenter and joiner was much narrower, for each was capable of doing the other's work. The articles pertaining to chestmakers, in the joiners' Ordnung, reveal the early stages in the definition of a trade -- a specialty within the guild was becoming a separate entity. The split in the Barbers and Bathers Guild in 1638 represents the culmination of this process, as each trade was recognized as an independent Handwerk. The clear definition of trades and the markets for these trades was one of the guilds' most important functions.

Markets were also the main concern in retailing. Here again, the common perception has been that price regulations were paramount, but this was not the case. Only in key areas, such as food supply, did the city regulate prices, and in this Augsburg was typical.<s113>s The other guilds did not trouble themselves in this regard. They did, however, concern themselves with retail markets; what could be bought and sold, when and by whom. The goal of these articles was the same as those governing production -- to prevent encroachment by one guild on the province of another. In fact, there were far more articles on retailing than on production, probably because it was more feasible to regulate the point of sale than to regulate what went on inside the shop. It may also have been the case that production was considered private, whereas buying and selling were more in the public domain and in the proper sphere of government interference. Whatever the reasons, there is no doubt that the focus of economic regulations in general was on markets rather than on production.

Another common area of concern was labor. Here there was a wide divergence in approach, though certain themes do emerge. Nowhere was there freedom of movement for labor. Every shop was ruled by the master, one master per shop and one shop per master -- all who worked there were under his authority. No abrupt departures were allowed: the apprentice could not leave without permission; the journeyman could not leave without due notice. The master could not terminate their employment without cause, and even then the employee had the right of appeal. Hiring was likewise regulated, taking place at fixed times only and in some cases in fixed places. As markets were to be restricted, so was labor. This was a reflection of the actual relations within the guilds. Apprentices and journeymen were inferiors who were under the direction and care of their masters as long as they worked in his shop. There were some journeymen who were independent, and they were free to earn their living as best they could. The question might be asked, as indeed it was eventually asked, why have these gradations at all, why have masters and journeymen and apprentices? The answer can be found in the areas of social and economic legislation. The ranks served as points of control, socially and economically, for even as each status could be granted (under terms), so could it be revoked as punishment.

The subject of controls brings up the final area of concern: administration and enforcement. Enforcement was achieved through the imposition of fines in the first resort, imprisonment as a more severe alternative, and expulsion as a last resort. More important than the fines were the officials who imposed them. The administrative machinery was virtually the same in all the guilds, a reflection of the complete control exercised by the City Council in this area.

The most important of the guild officials were the Guild Overseers (Vorgehern). Every guild had two of these, whose main responsibility was the enforcement of the guild regulations. They had the power to impose fines and other penalties, as specified in the regulations. Their approval was required for admission of new masters into the guild, and they had the power to turn applicants away. They functioned as intermediaries between city and guild, being both spokesmen on behalf of the guild before the Rat, and guardians of the city's interests.<s114>s The Overseers were, in many respects, the successors to the ruling committees of the medieval guilds. Called Zw[lfern because they usually consisted of twelve members, they possessed powers and authority similar to the Overseers, but the Zw[lfern were elected by the guildsmen while the Overseers were appointed officials. The abolition of the Zw[lfern was one of the most fundamental changes wrought by Charles V in 1549.

The Verordneten Meistern aided the Overseers. They acted as witnesses to important events, such as the recording of names or induction of a master. They probably kept the Einschreibbuch and the Meisterbuch, the official lists of apprentices and masters. They also provided expert advice to the Overseer on difficult points of precedence and interpretation regarding guild rules and practices. Whereas the Overseer was not necessarily a guildsman, the Verordneten were composed of both guildsmen and outsiders, appointed by the city.<s115>s

The Geschaumeister was an official with the very specific power to inspect, hence he may be called the Guild Inspector. The Inspectors supervised the making of all masterpieces, making sure that everything was done according to the rules (it was the Overseer's job to judge the quality of the finished product). They also supervised activities in the marketplace, reporting all violations to the Overseer, who would actually impose the punishment. In some guilds, the Inspector played a major role, inspecting the quality of the finished goods and graded them for sale. In other guilds, such as the Barbers and Bathers, their role was very limited.

There were other officers, whose functions were less clear, or who did not appear in every guild. The Sworn Masters (geschworne Meistern) could be sworn to almost any purpose, and probably were something akin to a deputy. The Bu]meister was an official whose sole purpose was to keep tabs on troublemakers (St[rer).<s116>s

It remains to summarize these guilds by identifying their essential characteristics. The most basic question that must be asked is: whose guilds were they? Were they the creation of the city or of the artisans? The answer is that they were the creation of both. The influence of the government was strongest in terms of administration, in the creation of offices and in the appointment of officials. The masters had their strongest influence on the technical side, in the specifications for the masterpiece or the details of production and selling. The City Council was incapable of writing an Ordnung without expert advice, for it lacked sufficient knowledge. In matters of direct concern to the city, guildsmen could expect to be overruled on any point of dispute, but on more mundane issues they could expect to be left more or less alone.

Definition of markets, regulation of membership, and control over retailing and labor were the primary functions of the guilds, all of which were important to the city as well. The aims in each area were certainly conservative; one looks in vain for expansionist policies. The common desire of both city and guild was for stability and order, from which would surely issue peace and prosperity. This prize, sought by every city and every guild (and, indeed, every individual), was to be won through regulations, through good government, and the guilds were so structured as to serve this common goal.

NOTES

1 H.A. Barbierer und Bader Decretum in senatu 23 April 1638, GSLM# <s581>s,<s006>s.

2. H. A., Barbierer und Bader, Briefe from both cities, no date, GSLM# 581,006.

3. H.A., Barbierer und Bader, Decretum in senatu, 8 June 1638, GSLM# 581,006.

4. H.A., Barbierer und Bader, Decretum in senatu, 9 September 1638, GSLM# 581,006.

5. H.A., Barbierer und Bader, Ordnung, Article 2, 9 September 1638, GSLM# 581,006.

6. Wissell, Handwerks Recht, p. 138.

7. H.A., Barbierer und Bader, Ordnung, Article 3, GSLM# 581,006.

8. H.A., Barbierer und Bader, Ordnung, Article 4, GSLM# 581,006. 9 H.A. Barbierer und Bader Ordnung Article 5 GSLM# 581,<s0>s06.

10. See Chapter IV above, which shows statistically that there were few journeymen in this craft; and Chapter V, which explains why few journeymen were needed.

11. Groups of articles were marked by sub-headings, a common practice in guild regulations.

12. H.A., Barbierer und Bader, Ordnung, Articles 8, 6 and 7, respectively, GSLM# 581,006.

l3.''Wanderschaft'' was the term for the time spent by the journeyman travelling from town to town as part of his training. See Mummenhoff, Handwerker, pp. 61 - 62. ''Leibeigenschaft'' refers to a condition of birth; specifically, to a status of servitude or bondage. Anyone who belonged to a lord or to some corporation such as a monastery, was tainted with Leibeigenschaft (literally,''ownership of body''). This requirement was nearly universal among guilds. Among other things, it effectively excluded all rural people from guild membership. See Wissell, p. 68 for a discussion of this.

14. H.A., Barbierer und Bader, Ordnung, Article 9, GSLM# 581,006.

26. The Overseers were frequent<s1>sy ca<s11>sed the''verordneten Vorgehern.

27. H.A., Barbierer und Bader, Ordnung, Article 40, GSLM# 581,006.

28. H.A., Barbierer und Bader, Baderordnung, Article 44, GSLM# 581,006.

29. Danckert, Unehrliche Leute, pp. 89 - 90.

30. H. A., M^llerordnung, GSL M# 466,1 16. There are several versions of this Ordnung. I am using the first one dated 1549.

31. H.A., M^llerordnung, Articles 28 and 29, GSLM# 466,116.

32. H.A., M^llerordnung, Article 30, GSLM# 466,116.

33. H.A., M^llerordnung, Article 33, GSLM# 466,116.

34. H.A., M^llerordnung, Article 34, GSLM# 466,116.

35. H.A., M^llerordnung, Article 35, GSLM# 466,116.

36. H.A., M^llerordnung, Articles 39 and 37, respectively, GSLM# 466,116.

37 H A M^llerordnung Article 40 GSLM# 466,116.

38. H.A., M^llerordnung, Article 1, GSLM# 466,116.

39. H.A., M^llerordnung, Article 26, GSLM# 466,116.

40. H.A., M^llerordnung, Article 27, GSLM# 466,116.

41. Elsas, Umriss, vol. 1, p. 118.

42. The bulk of the Weberordnung was devoted to the cloth - who could

make it, how and for how much. Clasen, Weber, pp. 87 - 89.

43. H.A., M^ller, Instruction, Article 1, GSLM# 466,116.

44. H.A., M^ller, Instruction, Article 11, GSLM# 466,116.

45. H.A., M^ller, Instruction, Article 3, GSLM# 466,116.

46. H.A., M^ller, Instruction, Articles 5 and 28, GSLM# 466,116.

47. H.A., M^ller, Instruction, Article 7, GSLM# 466,116.

48. H.A., M^ller, Instruction, Article 6, GSLM# 466,116.

49 H A M^ller Instruction Article 8, GSLM# 466,116.

50. H.A., M^ller, Instruction, Article 9, GSLM# 466,116. Article 22 describes how this was done.

51. H.A., M^ller, Instruction, Article 10, GSLM# 466,116.

52. H.A., M^ller, Instruction, Article 12, GSLM# 466,116.

53. H.A., M^ller, Instruction, Article 13, GSLM# 466,116.

54. H.A., M^ller, Instruction, Article 15, GSLM# 466,116.

55. H.A., M^ller, Instruction, Article 17, GSLM# 466,116.

56. H.A., Instruction, Article 18, GSLM# 466,116.

57. H.A., Instruction, Articles 19 and 20, GSLM# 466,116.

58. H.A., M^ller, Instruction, Article 21, GSLM# 466,116.

59. H.A., M^ller, Instruction, Article 30, GSLM# 466,116.

60. H.A., Kistler, Article 80, ca. 1568, GSLM# 534,605.

H A H<il>i.<ist>il<ier>i A<ir>iti<ic1es 43>i 4<i3a 44 an>id 46 <ica.>i 1570, GSLM# 534,605.

61. H.A., --------,

62. H.A., Kistler, Article 1, ante 1664, GSLM# 534,609. These articles, numbered 1 - 5, seem to go with articles 55 - 58. Both sets concern the Geschaumeistern and physicaily lie next to each other (1 - 5 begin on page 361; 55 - 57 are on page 360; Article 58 is on another microfilm and is dated much earlier, but concerns the same subject and preserves the numeric sequence). Articles 1 - 5 are in the form of a proposed amendment, which accounts for their numbering.

63. H.A., Kistler, Article 55, ca. 1664 GSLM# 534,609.

64. H.A., Kistler, Article 56, ca. 1664, GSLM# 534,609.

65. H.A., Kistler, Article 29, ca. 1650, GSLM# 534,609.

66. The last clause shows that the labor market had at one time been fairly open. It would be useful to know when the change occurred, but these articles unfortunately are not dated. They appear among documents from around 1650, but this merely fixes the date post guem, and they may have been written iong before.

67. H.A., Kistler, Article 2a, ca. 1550, GSLM# 534,605.

68 H A Kistler Article 3a ca. 1550, GSLM# 534,605.

69. H.A., Kistler, Article 30, ca. 1650, GSLM# 534,609.

70. H.A., Kistler, Article la, ca. 1550, GSLM# 534,605.

71. H.A., Kistler, Article 70, ca. 1646, GSLM# 534,610.

72. H.A., Kistler, Article 73, ca 1655., GSLM# 534,610

73. H.A., Kistler, Article 74, ca. 1655, GSLM# 534,610.

74. H.A., Kistler, Articles 75 and 76, for example, ca. 1671, GSLM# 534,610.

75. H.A., Kistler, Article 87, ca. 1675, GSLM# 534,610.

76. H.A., Kistler, Article 86, ca. 1675, GSLM# 534,610.

77. H.A., Kistler, Article 85, ca. 1675, GSLM# 534,610.

78. H.A., Kistler, Article 88, ca. 1675, GSLM# 534,610.

79. H.A., Kistler, Article 3, ca. 1567, GSLM# 534,605. 80 H A Kl.stler Article 29 ca 1590 GSLM# 534,606.

80. H.A, --------,

81. H.A., Kistler, Article 38, ca. 1573, GSLM# 534,605.

82. H.A., Kistler, Articles 47 - 50, ca. 1585, GSLM# 534,609.

83. H.A., Kistler, Articles 93 and 94, ca. 1590, GSLM# 534,608.

84. H.A., Kistler, Article 37, no date, GSLM# 534,607.

85. H.A., Kistler, Article 51, ca. 1670, GSLM# 534,609.

86. H.A., Kistler, Article 42, ca. 1575, GSLM# 534,608; and H.A., Kistler,

Article 53, ca. 1670, GSLM# 534,609.

87. H.A., Kistler, Article 54, ca. 1670, GSLM# 534,609.

88. H.A., Kistler, Article 38, ca. 1575, GSLM# 534,608.

89. H.A., Kistler, Article 39, ca. 1649, GSLM# 534,609. This is another indication that men were expected to run the business whenever possible, a widow was simply a transitional figure.

A Kl.stler Article 49 ca 1649 GSLM# 534,609.

90. H.A., -K--l-s-t-l-e-r-,

91. H.A., Kistler, Article 4, ante 1664, GSLM# 534,608.

92. H.A., Kistler, Article 70, ca. 1646, GSLM# 534,610.

93. Seventy-three is the number of one of the surviving articles.

94. Zorn, Augsburg, p. 197.

95. H.A., Schuhmacher, Article 23, ante 1670, GSLM# 548,061.

96. H.A., Schuhmacher, Article 24, ante 1670, GSLM# 548,061.

97. H.A., Schuhmacher, Article 26, ante 1670, GSLM# 548,061.

98. Hazard, The Boot and Shoe Industr, p. 12.

99. H.A., Schuhmacher, Article 21, ante 1670, GSLM# 548,061.

100. H.A., Schuhmacher, Article 2, ca. 1609, GSLM# 548,060.

101. H.A., Schuhmacher, Articul, ante 1662, GSLM# 548,062. 102. H.A. Schuhmacher Article 10 ante 1635, GSLM# 548,061.

103. Richard T. Rapp, Industry and Economic Decline in Seventeenth Century

Venice, (Cambridge and London, 1976), p. 112.

104. Rapp, Industry and Economic Decline, pp. 158 - 159.

105. Rapp, Industry and Economic Decline, p. 48.

106. I cannot explain the dramatic difference, but if it proves out in other guilds, it may be one difference between the medievai and the early modern guild.

107. Danckert, Unehrliche Leute, pp. 64 - 87 for bathers, pp. 88 - 91 for barbers, and pp. 125 - 145 for millers.

108. Wissell, Handwerks Recht, devotes an extended discussion of the subject in volume one, pp. 67 - 136.

109. Walker, German Home Towns, pp. 78 - 79.

110. Walker, German Home Towns, p. 85.

1 1 1. Nikolaus Paulus, ''Zur Geschichte des Wortes Beruf'', Historisches

Jahrbuch 45 (1925), p. 314.

112. Ernst Kelter, Geschichte der obrigkeitlichen Presireglung, (Jena, 1935), pp. 38 - 39.

113. The Overseers were knowledgeable in guild affairs and were generally sympathetic to the needs of the guildsmen, even though the Overseers were

not usually themselves members of the guild they supervised. Clasen, Augsurge Weber, p. 79.

114. Clasen, Augsburger Weber, p. 440.

115. Clasen, Augsurge Weber, p. 437.